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Abstract
In the year 1876 the mathematician Charles Dodgson, who wrote fiction under the
now more famous name of Lewis Carroll, devised a beautiful voting system that has long
fascinated political scientists. However, determining the winner of a Dodgson election
is known to be complete for the Θp2 level of the polynomial hierarchy. This implies
that unless P = NP no polynomial-time solution to this problem exists, and unless the
polynomial hierarchy collapses to NP the problem is not even in NP. Nonetheless, we
prove that when the number of voters is much greater than the number of candidates—
although the number of voters may still be polynomial in the number of candidates—a
simple greedy algorithm very frequently finds the Dodgson winners in such a way that
it “knows” that it has found them, and furthermore the algorithm never incorrectly
declares a nonwinner to be a winner.
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Introduction

Suppose that a group of individuals is voting among three candidates (or alternatives),
call these candidates a, b, and c. Further suppose that four-ninths of the voters rank the
candidates, in order of strictly increasing preference, (c, b, a), that three-ninths rank them
(a, b, c), and that the remaining two-ninths rank them (a, c, b). So five-ninths of the voters
prefer b to a and six-ninths of the voters prefer b to c. A candidate such as b, i.e., a candidate
who when paired against each other candidate is preferred by a strict majority of the voters,
is called a Condorcet winner [Con85].
∗
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A voting system maps from candidates and voters (each of whose preference order over
the candidates is represented by a strict, linear order) to a winner set, which must be a
subset of the candidate set. As Condorcet noted in the 1700s [Con85] it is quite possible
that sometimes there is no Condorcet winner. The classic example is the following. Given
a choice between a, b, and c, one-third of a group might rank (in order of strictly increasing
preference) the candidates (a, b, c), another third might rank them (b, c, a), and the remaining third might rank them (c, a, b). So two-thirds of the voters prefer b to a, two-thirds
of the voters prefer a to c, and two-thirds of the voters prefer c to b. Clearly, there is no
Condorcet winner. A voting system is said to obey the Condorcet criterion if it selects the
Condorcet winner whenever one exists.
The Condorcet criterion may seem so natural that one might at first glance fail to see
that many of the most widely-used voting rules do not meet it. For instance, in the “4/9,
3/9, 2/9” example above, if the voters were to use plurality-rule—i.e., a candidate is the
winner if he or she receives the most first-place votes—then the group would choose a. As
a second example, if instead the group were to hold an election under instant-runoff voting,
c would win and b would be the first candidate eliminated. In instant-runoff voting, if no
candidate is listed as the most favorite by a majority of the voters then each candidate who
is listed as the most favorite by the fewest voters (i.e., b in our example) is dropped from
preference lists and the election is recomputed with the edited lists; the process ends when
a majority winner emerges (or due to ties all candidates have been removed). Examples
where election systems fail to meet the Condorcet criterion are hardly new. In the 1800’s
Nanson [Nan82] wrote on the fact that well-known voting systems, such as Borda’s [Bor84]
famous rank-based point system, fail to satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
In 1876 the mathematician Charles Dodgson, whose name when an author of fiction
was the now famous pseudonym of Lewis Carroll, devised a voting system [Dod76] that has
many lovely properties and meets the Condorcet criterion. In Dodgson’s system, each voter
strictly ranks (i.e., no ties allowed) all candidates in the election. If a Condorcet winner
exists, he or she wins the Dodgson election. If no Condorcet winner exists, Dodgson’s
approach is to take as winners all candidates that are “closest” to being Condorcet winners,
with closest being in terms of the fewest changes to the votes needed to make the candidate
a Condorcet winner. We will in Section 2 describe what exactly Dodgson means by “fewest
changes,” but intuitively speaking, it is the smallest number of sequential switches between
adjacent entries in the rankings the voters provide. It can thus be seen as a sort of “edit
distance” [SK83].
Dodgson wrote about his voting system in a pamphlet on the conduct of elections [Dod76]. It is now regarded as a classic of social choice theory [Bla58,MU95]. Dodgson’s system was a relatively early example of a system satisfying the Condorcet criterion—
though, remarkably, the Catalan mystic Ramon Llull in the thirteenth century had already
proposed a system that satisfies the Condorcet criterion and has many other strengths (see
[HP01,FHHR07]).
Although Dodgson’s system has many nice properties, it also poses computational problems that are serious enough to make it an impractical choice for a general voting system
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that is guaranteed to work efficiently in any setting: The problem of checking whether
a certain number of changes suffices to make a given candidate the Condorcet winner is
NP-complete [BTT89], and the problem of computing an overall winner, as well as the
related problem of checking whether a given candidate is at least as close as another given
candidate to being a Dodgson winner, is complete for Θp2 [HHR97]. The Θp2 level of the
polynomial hierarchy can be defined as the class of problems solvable with polynomial-time
parallel access to an NP oracle ([PZ83], see also [Hem89,Wag90]). More recent work has
shown that some other important election systems are complete for Θp2 : Hemaspaandra,
Spakowski, and Vogel [HSV05] have shown Θp2 -completeness for the winner problem in Kemeny elections, and Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel [RSV03] have shown Θp2 -completeness
for the winner problem in Young elections. The above complexity results about Dodgson
elections show, quite dramatically, that unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses there is
no efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithm that is guaranteed to always determine the
winners of a Dodgson election. Does this then mean that Dodgson’s widely studied and
highly regarded voting system is unusable?
It turns out that if a small degree of uncertainty is tolerated, then there is a simple,
polynomial-time algorithm, GreedyWinner (the name’s appropriateness will later become
clear), that takes as input a Dodgson election and a candidate from the election and outputs
an element in {“yes”, “no”}× {“definitely”, “maybe”}. The first component of the output is
the algorithm’s guess as to whether the input candidate was a winner of the input election.
The second output component indicates the algorithm’s confidence in its guess. Regarding
the accuracy of GreedyWinner, we show that for each (election, candidate) pair, it holds that
if GreedyWinner outputs “definitely” as its second output component, then its first output
component correctly answers the question, “Is the input candidate a Dodgson winner of the
input election?” (This is an example of what we call self-knowing correctness; Definition 3.1
will make this formal.) We also show that for each m, n ∈ N+ the probability that a Dodgson
election E selected uniformly at random from all Dodgson elections having m candidates
and n votes (i.e., all (m!)n Dodgson elections having m candidates and n votes have the
same likelihood of being selected 1) has the property that there exists at least one candidate
c such that GreedyWinner on input (E, c) outputs “maybe” as its second output component
−n
is less than 2(m2 − m)e 8m2 .
Thus for elections where the number of voters greatly exceeds the number of candidates (though the former could still be within a (superquadratic) polynomial of the latter, consistently with the success probability for a family of election draws thus-related in
voter-candidate cardinality going asymptotically to 1), if one randomly chooses an election
E = (C, V ), then with high likelihood it will hold that for each c ∈ C the efficient algorithm
GreedyWinner when run on input (C, V, c) correctly determines whether c is a Dodgson
1

Since Dodgson voting is not sensitive to the names of candidates, we will throughout this paper always
tacitly assume that all m-candidate elections have the fixed candidate set 1, 2, . . . , m (though in some
examples we for clarity will use other names, such as a, b, c, and d). So, though we to be consistent
with earlier papers on Dodgson elections allow the candidate set “C” to be part of the input, in fact we
view this as being instantly coerced into the candidate set 1, 2, . . . , m. And we similarly view voter names
as uninteresting.
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winner of E, and moreover will “know” that it got those answers right. So GreedyWinner
is a self-knowingly correct heuristic, and we will prove the above claims showing it is frequently (self-knowingly) correct.2 Though the GreedyWinner algorithm on its surface is
about recognizing Dodgson winners, as discussed in Section 3 our algorithm can be easily
modified into one that is about, given an E = (C, V ), finding the complete set of Dodgson
Winners and that does so in a way that is, in essentially the same high frequency as for
GreedyWinner, self-knowingly correct. Later in this paper, we will introduce another frequently self-knowingly correct heuristic, called GreedyScore, for calculating the Dodgson
score of a given candidate.
The study of greedy algorithms has an extensive history (see the textbook [CLRS01]
and the references therein). Much is known in terms of settings where a greedy algorithm
provides a polynomial-time approximation, for example [ACP95], and of guarantees that
a greedy algorithm will frequently solve a problem—for example Kaporis, Kirousis, and
Lalas study how frequently a greedy algorithm finds a satisfying assignment to a boolean
formula [KKL02], and many additional excellent examples exist, e.g., [CK76,PT83,Sla97,
Bro01]. However, each of these differs from our work in either not being about self-knowing
correctness or, if about self-knowing correctness, in being about an NP-certificate type of
problem. In contrast, as discussed in more detail immediately after Definition 3.1, the
problem studied in this paper involves objects that are computationally more demanding
than mere certificates for NP set membership.
Among earlier algorithms having a self-knowingly correct flavor, a particularly interesting one (though, admittedly, it is about finding certificates for NP set membership) is due to
Goldberg and Marchetti-Spaccamela [GMS84]. Goldberg and Marchetti-Spaccamela construct for every ǫ > 0 a modified greedy algorithm that is deterministic, runs in polynomial
time (where the polynomial depends on ǫ), and with probability at least 1− ǫ self-knowingly
finds an optimal solution of a randomly chosen (from a particular, but natural, distribution) instance of the knapsack problem. (They call their algorithm “self checking” rather
than “self-knowingly correct.”) Besides being about an NP-type problem rather than a
“Θp2 ”-type problem such as Dodgson elections, a second way in which this differs from our
work is that the running time of our algorithms does not depend on the desired likelihood
of correctness.
The concept of a heuristic that is effective on a significant portion of the problem instances of some very hard (e.g., not even in NP unless NP = coNP) problem and furthermore
has the additional property that it can very frequently guarantee that its answers are correct is related to other theoretical frameworks. Parameterized complexity [DF99] studies
hard problems that have efficient solutions when instances of the problem are restricted by
fixing one or more of the parameters that describe the instances. The two most natural
parameters of Dodgson elections are the number of candidates and the number of voters.
It is known that with either of these parameters bounded by a constant, Dodgson elections
2

As we just did in the second half of that sentence, in a slight abuse of notation we will sometimes speak
of inputs on which a self-knowingly correct algorithm has the second component “definitely” as instances on
which it is self-knowingly correct.
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have polynomial-time algorithms [BTT89]. However, we are interested in cases when no
such dramatic bounding of a parameter by a constant occurs.
Like average-case ([Lev86], see also the excellent surveys [Wan97a,Wan97b]) and
smoothed [ST04] analyses, our analysis of DodgsonWinner is probabilistic. But while those
methods are concerned with the expected value over segments of the problem domain of
some resource of interest, typically time or a transformed version of time, we focus on a quite
different property: correctness. Other recent papers also focusing on frequency (or probability weight) of correctness for hard voting-related problems (though not Dodgson voting)
include work of Conitzer and Sandholm [CS06] and Procaccia and J. Rosenschein [PR07].
Those papers both assume a skewed underlying preference distribution, and in contrast our
paper is focused on a uniform preference distribution.3
The paper that is closest to the present paper is the independent work of McCabeDansted, Pritchard, and Slinko [MPS06]. The core insight there is the same as our core
insight: That for appropriate numbers of candidates and voters it will hold that, if voter
preferences are independent and uniform, then on a very large portion of cases one can,
purely by making swaps between one’s candidate of interest and people adjacently beating it within votes, make the candidate a Condorcet winner (i.e., shift enough to precisely
eliminate any shortfalls). We now in the main text summarize the three major differences
between [MPS06] and our work. The footnotes to this summary contain additional discussion that, while important for completeness, may be safely omitted on a first reading.
The first major difference between our work and that of McCabe-Dansted, Pritchard,
and Slinko is that their heuristic, DodgsonQuick, outputs just a score. Although that
score is correct on a large portion of inputs, their DodgsonQuick doesn’t on any particular
input ever guarantee that the score is correct. In contrast, our GreedyScore heuristic is
frequently self-knowingly correct—on a large portion of inputs, it gives the right answer and
guarantees that that answer is right. McCabe-Dansted, Pritchard, and Slinko state that
their DodgsonQuick is simpler than our GreedyScore. However, this is precisely because
DodgsonQuick is just tossing out a score, rather than working to ensure self-knowingness.
If one changed their DodgsonQuick to explicitly handle self-knowingness, it would become
almost identical to our algorithm. Indeed, whenever our algorithm is self-knowingly correct,
its computed score would coincide exactly with their algorithm’s computed score—if one
3

To avoid any possibility of confusion, we should mention that there seems to be a slight inching toward using the term “average-case tractability” to apply to frequency (or probability weight) of correctness
claims (see also Impagliazzo’s [Imp95] framework called heuristic polynomial time), even though such claims
typically do not imply that any natural or transformed sort of averaging yields polynomial growth [Tre02,
EHRS07]. [PR07] is an example of such a usage in a voting context and [BT06] is an example in a context
far removed from voting. It is admittedly a matter of taste and of what is most natural in English, but
we feel that to avoid the confusion of overloaded and nonintuitive terminology, it would be best to use the
words “average-case” only when referring to true averaging or to Levin’s averaging-related approach. When
speaking of frequency (or probability weight) of correctness, those terms themselves, or speaking of the
“usual-case complexity” ([CS06] use the word “usual” in their title, for example), or using the nomenclature of heuristic polynomial time [Imp95] are best. (“Typical-case complexity” would be a very attractive
phrasing, but a prominent average-case researcher has already suggested using those words synonymously
with Levin’s “average-case complexity.”) [EHRS07] provides additional discussion of these issues.
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modified their algorithm to correct for the “third major difference” mentioned below.
The second major difference regards range of application. Our analysis leaves both the
number of candidates and the number of voters as variables. By doing so, we produce
a general bound flexible enough to ensure that the correctness (indeed, the self-knowing
correctness) probability, under uniform-like inputs, goes asymptotically to one as long as
the number of voters is at least some more-than-quadratic polynomial in the number of
candidates. In sharp contrast, their claims cover just the subcase of this in which the
number of candidates is held constant, while the number of voters increases.4
A third and easy-to-miss major difference is that our Dodgson score is indeed Dodgson’s
score notion: The number of swaps needed to make the candidate a strictly beat each
other candidate in a head-on-head comparison (Dodgson’s crucial words relating to this are
“absolute majority” [Dod76]), i.e., become a Condorcet winner in the standard sense of
that term. In contrast, [MPS06], without mentioning that it is differing from the settled
notion of Dodgson score, uses as its definition of that concept a quite different score: The
number of swaps needed to make the candidate tie or beat each other candidate in a head4

We note in passing that the fixed-number-of-candidates case is a somewhat unusual choice of case to focus
on regarding approximation, since for this case it has been long known that there is an exact polynomial-time
algorithm, namely the Lenstra-method-based approach of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89]. In addition
to that case, namely the standard (i.e., nonsuccinct) case, McCabe-Dansted, Pritchard, and Slinko [MPS06]
also look—again just for a fixed number, call it m, of candidates—at the issue of succinct inputs, a question
that at first blush might seem to be untroubled by the Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89] algorithm
mentioned above. In the succinct input case, inputs are assumed to be given as a list of counts of each vote
type (there naturally are m! possible vote types). Note that in the succinct model, the input size is Θ(log n),
where n is the number of voters. For this fixed-number-of-candidates, succinct-input case, McCabe-Dansted,
Pritchard, and Slinko give an exact algorithm (which does in effect incorporate self-knowingness and the
work it takes to achieve that) that runs in—under their proof’s understanding—worst-case time exponential
in the input size and runs in expected time (under uniform-like input distribution) polynomial —even linear in
the right machine model—in the input size which, recall, is Θ(log n). However, we mention that Faliszewski,
Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra ([FHH06a, p. 645], see also [FHH06b]) have already noted that the
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89] approach gives an exact, worst-case polynomial time in the Θ(log n)
input size algorithm for the succinct case of fixed-number-of-candidates Dodgson score.
Nonetheless, one may still find value in the McCabe-Dansted, Pritchard, and Slinko succinct-case, fixednumber-of-candidates algorithm. In particular, it has—in the right machine model, as degrees of polynomials
depend on one’s machine model—as they state a linear (in the Θ(log n) input size) expected running time.
In contrast, the Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89] algorithm, shifted to the succinct case as per the
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra comment, would seem to have a (worst-case, though quite
possibly its expected time would not be better) running time that is at the very least quadratic in the
Θ(log n) input size. (The reason it would seem to be at least quadratic is a bit technical: The underlying
attack uses Lenstra’s brilliant algorithm for integer programming with a fixed number of variables [Len83],
and even solving a single integer program instance using Lenstra’s method (see [Dow03, Nie02]) involves
a linear number of operations on linear-sized integers, where both of those “linear”s are relative to its
input size, which in the succinct case here would be Θ(log n).) Finally, we note that if one reconsiders the
McCabe-Dansted, Pritchard, and Slinko succinct-case, fixed-number-of-candidates algorithm in light of the
Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra comment about Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick’s Lenstra-based
approach adapted to the succinct case, then one can correctly assert (for the thus adapted algorithm) linear
expected time (relative to a uniform-like distribution) and polynomial worst-case time, all relative to the
input size of Θ(log n). Again, we stress that this entire footnote refers just to the very restricted case of
fixing the number of candidates.
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on-head comparison. For clarity, let us refer to this notion as variantDscore. (To see that
this is what they define, one must carefully note their nonstandard definition of Condorcet
winner.) The difference between Dodgson score and variantDscore is not just an “off by
one” in the score. In fact, intervening candidates may have to be crossed to best close a
shifted gap, and so variantDscore can vary from being the same as the Dodgson score in
some cases to being nontrivially smaller in other cases. On the other hand, due to the fact
that both their and our algorithms focus on cases where purely adjacent swaps, at most one
per voter, can triumph, this difference has just a relatively mild reflection in the formulas
and algorithms of the two papers. For example, it is this difference that results in their
paper having expressions such as ⌈z/2⌉ in contrast with, in our paper, expressions such as
⌊z/2⌋ + 1.5
Like approximation algorithms, our algorithms are time efficient even in the worst case.
But approximation algorithms typically have worst-case guarantees on how far the answers
they provide deviate from the optimal answers. We by contrast are only interested in
how frequently the algorithms are correct. Even when we study optimization problems, as
with GreedyScore, we make no guarantees on how close actual Dodgson scores are to the
corresponding answers that GreedyScore provides in cases when the confidence is “maybe.”
Additionally, the key feature that separates our work from each of the above-mentioned
related frameworks is the “self-knowing” aspect of our work. The closest related concepts
to this aspect of our analysis are probably those involving proofs to be verified, such as
NP certificates and the proofs in interactive proof systems. Although our algorithms do
5

The fact that [MPS06] is about variantDscore rather than Dodgson score causes two potential problems. The first, which is bad news for [MPS06], is that their succinct-case algorithm (footnote 4 above
discusses the succinct case) potentially is invalid, since it in rare cases falls back to the Bartholdi, Tovey,
and Trick algorithm and assumes that that algorithm has the same notion of Dodgson score as it does. The
second, which is good news for [MPS06], is that if what they call Dodgson score (variantDscore) and what
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick call Dodgson score differ, then our comments in footnote 4 above how their
fixed-candidate work is related to the Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick/Lenstra approach potentially become
off-the-mark. Both these problems/inconsistencies are smoothed over by the following easy observations
that we now make: (a) the Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick algorithm can be modified to work with either
Dodgson score or variantDscore (one sets which case the algorithm does simply by appropriately setting the
values dk of [BTT89, p. 162]), and (b) the fact that the Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick/Lenstra approach, as
noted by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra, gives for the fixed-number-of-candidates case an
algorithm running in time polynomial in the Θ(log n) input size easily applies (with an immediately clear
modification) to both the Dodgson score case and the variantDscore case. Finally, to be completely fair, we
mention that though we feel that all three papers [Dod76, BTT89, Tid87] that McCabe-Dansted, Pritchard,
and Slinko [MPS06] cite regarding the definition of Dodgson score in fact do define Dodgson score rather
than variantDscore, in each case this depends on whether one’s reading of such terms as “absolute majority,”
“beats,” “greater than,” and “defeats” allows ties to fall within the scope of the term; we feel it does not.
Although for the case of Dodgson’s paper (“absolute majority”) and Tideman’s (“the number is... greater
than”), two of the three papers they cite, the case is pretty airtight that those papers are defining Dodgson score (and not variantDscore), for Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick (“defeats” and “to become a Condorcet
winner”—though [BTT89] at one point does write, though we feel the “unique” is just to emphasize that
when they exist, Condorcet winners are unique—the strange phrase “a unique Condorcet winner”) there
is perhaps very slightly more wiggle room. In any case, our observations (a) and (b) smooth over the two
potential problems mentioned at the start of this footnote.
We refer the reader to [MPS06] and [Tid87] itself for more on Tideman’s early, insightful paper.
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not provide actual certificates, one could reasonably require a transcript of the execution of
either of our algorithms. With such a transcript, it would be easy to verify in deterministic
polynomial time that the algorithm, in cases where the confidence is “definitely,” presented
a valid proof. Put somewhat differently, our algorithms can easily be modified to give, in
each “definitely” case, a specific set of swaps that achieve a Dodgson score that is clearly
optimal. By contrast, in interactive proof systems the methods for verifying the proofs
involve a probabilistic, interactive process. We do not consider interactive processes in this
paper. In Section 3 we discuss in more detail the differences between heuristics that find
NP certificates and self-knowingly correct algorithms, but the most obvious difference is
that, unless coNP = NP, the problem of verifying whether a given candidate is a Dodgson
winner for a given election is not even in NP.

2

Dodgson Elections

As mentioned in the introduction, in Dodgson’s voting system each voter strictly ranks
the candidates in order of preference. Formally speaking, for m, n ∈ N+ —throughout this
paper we by definition do not admit as valid elections with zero candidates or zero voters—a
Dodgson election is an ordered pair (C, V ) where C is a set {c1 , . . . , cm } of candidates (as
noted earlier, we without loss of generality view them as being named by 1, 2, . . . , m)
and V is a tuple (v1 , . . . , vn ) of votes and a Dodgson triple, denoted (C, V, c), is a Dodgson
election (C, V ) together with a candidate c ∈ C. Each vote is one of the m! total orderings
over the candidates, i.e., it is a complete, transitive, and antireflexive relation over the set of
candidates. We will sometimes denote a vote by listing the candidates in increasing order,
e.g., (x, y, z) is a vote over the candidate set {x, y, z} in which y is preferred to x and z is
preferred to (x and) y. A candidate is never preferred to him- or herself. For vote v and
candidates c, d ∈ C, “c <v d” means “in vote v, d is preferred to c” and “c ≺v d” means
“c <v d and there is no e such that c <v e <v d.” Each Dodgson election gives rise to m
2
pairwise races, each of which is created by choosing two distinct candidates c, d ∈ C and
restricting each vote v to the two chosen candidates, that is, to either (c, d) or (d, c). The
winner of the pairwise race is the one that a strict majority of voters prefer. Due to ties, a
winner may not always exist in pairwise races.
A Condorcet winner is any candidate c that, against each remaining candidate, is preferred by a strict majority of voters. For a given election (i.e., for a given sequence of votes),
it is possible that no Condorcet winner exists. However, when one does exist, it is unique.
Dodgson’s scores are in a sense an edit-distance notion based on the basic operation of
swapping adjacent candidates in a voter’s preference order. In particular, for any vote v
and any c, d ∈ C, if c ≺v d, let Swap c,d(v) denote the vote v ′ , where v ′ is the same total
ordering of C as v except that d <v′ c (note that this implies d ≺v′ c). If c 6≺v d then
Swap c,d (v) is undefined. In effect, a swap causes c and d to “switch places,” but only if
c and d are adjacent. The Dodgson score of a Dodgson triple (C, V, c) is the minimum
number of swaps that, applied sequentially to the votes in V , make V a sequence of votes
in which c is the Condorcet winner. A Dodgson winner is a candidate that has the smallest
8

Dodgson score. This is the election system developed in the year 1876 by Dodgson (Lewis
Carroll) [Dod76], and as noted earlier it gives victory to the candidate(s) who are “closest”
to being Condorcet winners. Note that if no candidate is a Condorcet winner, then two or
more candidates may tie, in which case all tying candidates are Dodgson winners.
Several examples show how Dodgson elections work, and hint at why they are hard, in
general, to solve: Consider an election having four candidates {a, b, c, d} and one hundred
votes in which sixty are (a, b, c, d) and forty are (c, d, a, b). Since d is already (i.e., before any
exchanges take place) a Condorcet winner, d’s Dodgson score is 0. Thus d is the Dodgson
winner.
Now suppose in another election having the same candidates and the same number
of voters as in the previous example that twenty voters each vote (a, b, c, d), (b, c, d, a),
(c, d, a, b), (b, a, d, c), and (d, a, b, c), respectively. In this case, there is no Condorcet winner,
so we calculate the Dodgson score of each candidate. Consider candidate a. Candidate a
beats d by twenty votes—of course, changes in the votes of as few as eleven voters can
overcome such a shortfall. Candidate a loses to c by twenty votes. And candidate a loses
to b by twenty votes. What is the fewest number of swaps needed to make a a Condorcet
winner? It might be tempting to make, for each of eleven votes of the form (a, b, c, d),
the following transformation: (a, b, c, d) → (d, b, c, a). But this transformation is not an
allowed swap because only elements that are adjacent in the ordering imposed by the vote
may be swapped at unit cost. We can, however, make eleven of the following series of two
swaps each: (a, b, c, d) → (b, a, c, d) → (b, c, a, d). This can clearly be seen to be an optimal
number of swaps in light of a’s initial vote shortfalls—and note that every swap improves
a’s standing against either b or c in a way that directly reduces a still-existing shortfall. So
the Dodgson score of (C, V, a) is twenty-two.
What makes it hard to calculate Dodgson scores is what makes many combinatorial
optimization problems hard: There is no apparent, simple way to locally determine whether
a swap will lead to an optimally short sequence that makes the candidate of interest the
Condorcet winner. For instance, if in calculating the Dodgson score of a we had come
across votes of the form (b, a, d, c) first, we might have made the following series of swaps,
(b, a, d, c) → (b, d, a, c) → (b, d, c, a), which contain a swap between a and d. But this
series of swaps is not optimal because a already beats d, and because, as we saw, there
is already a series of twenty-two swaps available, where each swap helps a against some
adversary that a has not yet beaten, that makes a a Condorcet winner. (However, there
are instances of Dodgson elections in which the only way for a candidate to become a
Condorcet winner is for it to swap with adversaries that the candidate is already beating,
so one cannot simply ignore this possibility.) Assuming that we did not at first see the votes
that constitute this optimal sequence and instead hastily made swaps that did not affect
a’s current standing against b or c, we could have, as soon as we had come across votes of
the form (a, b, c, d), backtracked from the hastily made swaps that led toward a nonoptimal
solution and, eventually, have correctly calculated the Dodgson score. But as the size of
elections increases, the amount of backtracking that a naive strategy might need to make
in order to correct for any nonoptimal swaps combinatorially explodes.
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Of course, computational complexity theory can give evidence of hardness that is probably more satisfying than are mere examples. However, before turning to the computational
complexity of Dodgson-election-related problems, a couple of preliminary definitions are
in order. The class NP is precisely the set of all languages solvable in nondeterministic
polynomial time. Θp2 can be equivalently defined either as the class of languages solvable
in deterministic polynomial time with O(log n) queries to an NP language or as the class
of languages solvable in deterministic polynomial time via parallel access to NP. Θp2 was
first studied by Papadimitriou and Zachos [PZ83], received its current name from Wagner [Wag90], and has proven important in many contexts. In particular, it seems central
in understanding the complexity of election systems [HHR97,HH00,SV00,SV01,RSV03,
HSV05]. All NP languages are in Θp2 . It remains open whether Θp2 contains languages that
are not in NP; it does exactly if NP 6= coNP.
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT89] define the following decision problems, i.e., mappings from Σ∗ to {“yes”, “no”}, associated with Dodgson elections. We take the problem
wordings from [HHR97].
Decision Problem: DodgsonScore
Instance: A Dodgson triple (C, V, c); a positive integer k.
Question Is Score(C, V, c), the Dodgson score of candidate c in the election specified by
(C, V ), less than or equal to k?
Decision Problem: DodgsonWinner
Input: A Dodgson triple (C, V, c).
Question: Is c a winner of the election? That is, does c tie-or-defeat all other candidates
in the election?
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick show that the problem of checking whether a certain number of changes suffices to make a given candidate the Condorcet winner is NP-complete
and that the problem of determining whether a given candidate is a Dodgson winner is
NP-hard [BTT89]. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe show [HHR97] that this
latter problem, as well as the related problem of checking whether a given candidate is
at least as close as another given candidate to being a Dodgson winner, is complete for
Θp2 . Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe’s results show that determining a Dodgson winner is not even in NP unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. This line of work
has significance because the hundred-year-old problem of deciding if a given candidate is a
Dodgson winner was much more naturally conceived than the problems that were previously
known to be complete for Θp2 (see [Wag87]).

3

The GreedyScore and GreedyWinner Algorithms

In this section, we study the polynomial-time greedy algorithms GreedyScore and
GreedyWinner, which are given, respectively, as Figure 1 (page 13) and Figure 2 (page 14).
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We show that both algorithms are self-knowingly correct in the sense of the following definition.
Definition 3.1. For sets S and T and function f : S → T , an algorithm A : S →
T × {“definitely”, “maybe”} is self-knowingly correct for f if, for all s ∈ S and t ∈ T ,
whenever A on input s outputs (t, “definitely”) it holds that f (s) = t.
The reader may wonder whether “self-knowing correctness” is so easily added to heuristic schemes as to be uninteresting to study. For example, if one has a heuristic for finding
certificates for an NP problem with respect to some fixed certificate scheme (in the standard
sense of NP certificate schemes)—e.g., for trying to find a satisfying assignment to an input
(unquantified) propositional boolean formula—then one can use the P-time checker associated with the problem to “filter” the answers one finds, and can put the label “definitely” on
only those outputs that are indeed certificates. However, the problem studied in this paper
does not seem amenable to such after-the-fact addition of self-knowingness, as in this paper
we are dealing with heuristics that are seeking objects that are computationally much more
complex than mere certificates related to NP problems. In particular, a polynomial-time
function-computing machine seeking to compute an input’s Dodgson score seems to require
about logarithmically many adaptive calls to SAT.6
We call GreedyScore “greedy” because, as it sweeps through the votes, each swap it
(virtually) does immediately improves the standing of the input candidate against some
adversary that the input candidate is at that point losing to. The algorithm nonetheless is
very simple. It limits itself to at most one swap per vote. Yet, its simplicity notwithstanding, we will eventually prove that this (self-knowingly correct) algorithm is very frequently
correct.
Our results in this section, since they are just stated as simply polynomial-time results
(see Theorem 3.2 below), are not heavily dependent on the encoding scheme used. However,
we will for specificity give a specific scheme that can be used. Note that the scheme we use
will encode the inputs as binary strings by a scheme that is easy to compute and invert
and encodes each vote as an O(kCk log kCk)-bit substring and each Dodgson triple as an
O(kV k · kCk · log kCk)-bit string, where (C, V, c) is the input to the encoding scheme. For
a Dodgson triple (C, V, c), our encoding scheme is as follows.
- The first bits of the encoding string contain kCk, encoded as a binary string of length
⌈log (kCk + 1)⌉,7 preceded by the substring 1⌈log (kCk+1)⌉ 0.
6

We say “seems to,” but we note that one can make a more rigorous claim here. As mentioned in
Section 2, among the problems that Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR97] prove complete
for the language class Θp2 is DodgsonWinner. If one could, for example, compute Dodgson scores via a
polynomial-time function-computing machine that made a (globally) constant-bounded number of queries
to SAT, then this would prove that DodgsonWinner is in the boolean hierarchy [CGH+ 88], and thus that Θp2
equals the boolean hierarchy, which in turn would imply the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy [Kad88].
That is, this function problem is so closely connected to a Θp2 -complete language problem that if one can
save queries in the former, then one immediately has consequences for the complexity of the latter.
7
All logarithms in this paper are base 2. We use ⌈log (kCk + 1)⌉-bit strings rather than ⌈log (kCk)⌉-bit
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- Next in the encoding string are bits specifying the chosen candidate c, encoded as a binary
string of length ⌈log (kCk + 1)⌉.
- The rest of the bits of the encoding string give the votes, where each vote is encoded as
a binary substring of length kCk · ⌈log (kCk + 1)⌉.
Recall that the GreedyScore and GreedyWinner algorithms are defined in Figures 1
and 2. We now describe what our algorithms do. Briefly put, on input (C, V, c),
GreedyScore computes for each candidate d ∈ C−{c} the number of votes by which d
beats c in the pairwise contest between them, and the number of votes where c ≺v d. These
numbers are stored in Deficit[d] and Swaps[d], respectively. For example, if 17 voters prefer
d to c and 3 voters prefer c to d, then Deficit[d] will be set to 14. Note that in that case
a shift of 8 fan-of-d voters would change the outcome to a victory for c in this pairwise
contest. GreedyScore then takes as the Dodgson score
X
||{d ∈ C−{c} | Deficit[d] ≥ 2 × Swaps[d]}|| +
(⌊Deficit[d]/2⌋ + 1).
d∈C−{c}:Deficit[d]≥0

GreedyScore outputs this number, paired with “definitely” if (∀d ∈ C−{c})[Deficit [d] <
2 × Swaps[d]], or with “maybe,” otherwise.8
Turning to the GreedyWinner algorithm, it does the above for all candidates, and if
while doing so GreedyScore is never stumped, then GreedyWinner uses in the obvious way
the information it has obtained, and (correctly) states whether c is a Dodgson winner of
the input election.
Theorem 3.2.

1. GreedyScore is self-knowingly correct for Score.

2. GreedyWinner is self-knowingly correct for DodgsonWinner.
3. GreedyScore and GreedyWinner both run in polynomial time.
Proof. In item 1’s statement, as set in Section 2 in the statement of the DodgsonScore
problem, Score denotes the Dodgson score. Now, suppose that GreedyScore, on input
(C, V, c), returns “definitely” as the second component of its output. Then, as inspecting
lines 29–33 of the algorithm makes clear, every candidate d ∈ C−{c} for which Deficit[d] ≥ 0
must also have Deficit[d] < 2 × Swaps [d]. In this case, note that the algorithm sets its score
strings as we wish to have the size of the coding scale at least linearly with the number of voters—even in
the pathological kCk = 1 case, in which each vote carries no information other than about the number of
voters.
8
In the conference version of this paper [HH06] the algorithm—like the above modified algorithm—
had
P the property that whenever the confidence was “definitely,” the score that was output was
d∈C−{c}:Deficit[d]≥0 (⌊Deficit [d]/2⌋ + 1). However, for the conference version’s algorithm, whenever the
confidence was “maybe” the algorithm output a value that was a strict lower bound on the true score—and
so was certainly wrong. In contrast, the above algorithm in the “maybe” case outputs a half-hearted stab
at the score—one that is sometimes too high, sometimes right, and sometimes too low. In terms of our
theorems, the behavior on “maybe” cases doesn’t matter, as no promises are made about such cases.
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GreedyScore(C, V, c)
1  C is the set of candidates.
2  V is the list of votes.
3  c ∈ C is the candidate whose score the algorithm tries to compute.
4 for d ∈ C−{c}
 Initialize counter variables, which represent:
5
do Deficit[d] ← 0

The number of votes by which d is beating c.
6
Swaps[d] ← 0

The number votes that may be “greedily”
7

swapped against d.
8  Count the votes. (Each vote v is treated as an array where v[1] is the least
9 
preferred candidate, v[2] is the second least preferred candidate, and so
10 
on, and v[length[v]] is the most preferred candidate.)
11 for each vote v in V
12
do i ← 1
13
while v[i] 6= c
 Subtract the “pairwise votes” for c.
14
do d ← v[i]
15
Deficit[d] = Deficit[d] − 1
16
i←i+1
17
if i < length[v]
 Count the opportunities to “greedily swap.”
18
then d ← v[i + 1]
19
Swaps[d] ← Swaps[d] + 1
20
for i ← i + 1 to length[v]  Add the “pairwise votes” against c.
21
do d ← v[i]
22
Deficit[d] = Deficit[d] + 1
23 confidence ← “definitely”
24  Calculate the score. If there are enough greedily swappable votes to overcome
25 
all positive deficits, then the sum over one plus half of each positive deficit
26 
(rounded down) is certainly the Dodgson score of c.
27 score ← 0
28 for each d ∈ C−{c}
29
do if Deficit[d] ≥ 0
30
then score ← score + ⌊Deficit[d]/2⌋ + 1
31
if Deficit[d] ≥ 2 × Swaps [d]
32
then confidence ← “maybe”
33
score ← score + 1
34 return (score, confidence )
Figure 1: The GreedyScore algorithm
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GreedyWinner(C, V, c)
1  C is the set of candidates.
2  V is the list of votes.
3  c ∈ C. We wish to test whether c is a Dodgson winner in election (C, V ).
4 (cscore, confidence ) ← GreedyScore(C, V, c)
5 winner ← “yes”
6 for candidates d ∈ C−{c}
7
do (dscore, dcon) ← GreedyScore(C, V, d)
8
if dscore < cscore
9
then winner ← “no”
10
if dcon = “maybe”
11
then confidence ← “maybe”
12 return (winner, confidence )
Figure 2: The GreedyWinner algorithm
P
variable to score =
d∈C−{c}:Deficit[d]≥0 (⌊Deficit[d]/2⌋ + 1). For this value of score to
actually be the Dodgson score of c, we must show (a) that we can by performing score
swaps turn (C, V ) into an election in which c is the Condorcet winner and (b) that by
performing fewer than score swaps we cannot make c a Condorcet winner. Both claims
depend on the following observation: Let v be a vote having some candidate d such that
c ≺v d. Then swapping c and d would decrease by two the difference between the number
of votes where c is preferred d and the number of votes where d is preferred c. Also, c’s
standing against any candidate other than d would not be affected by this swap.
So, regarding the number of swaps needed to make c beat some d ∈ C−{c}, let Vd be
the set of votes in V in which c ≺c d. If Deficit[d] is, by line 29, nonnegative (if Deficit[d]
is negative then c already beats d and the number of swaps needed is trivially 0), and if
||Vd || ≥ ⌊Deficit[d]/2⌋ + 1, then we can make c beat d by choosing exactly ⌊Deficit[d]/2⌋ + 1
votes in Vd and swapping the positions of c in d in these votes. But Swaps[d] is precisely
||Vd || and is, by our Deficit[d] < 2 × Swaps[d] assumption, at least ⌊Deficit[d]/2⌋ + 1. Thus,
by summing over all such d ∈ C−{c}, score is enough swaps to make c a Condorcet winner,
and we have satisfied (a).
ToPsee (b), suppose that it is possible to make c a Condorcet winner with fewer
than d∈C−{c}:Deficit[d]≥0 (⌊Deficit[d]/2⌋ + 1) swaps. Then for some d ∈ C−{c} such that
Deficit[d] ≥ 0 it must hold that at most ⌊Deficit[d]/2⌋ of these swaps are applied to c’s
standing against d. But then, since as noted above one swap changes the deficit between c
and d by exactly two, we do not have enough swaps to make c beat d. So we must conclude
under our current supposition—namely, that GreedyScore returns “definitely” as the second component of its output—that score is the optimal number of swaps needed to make
c a Condorcet winner.
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For item 2, clearly GreedyWinner correctly checks whether c is a Dodgson winner if every
call it makes to GreedyScore correctly calculates the Dodgson score. GreedyWinner then
returns “definitely” exactly if each call it makes to GreedyScore returns “definitely.” But,
by item 1, GreedyScore is self-knowingly correct.
Item 3 follows from a straightforward analysis of the algorithm. The total number of
line-executions in a run of GreedyScore is clearly O(kV k · kCk), and for GreedyWinner
is, including the line-executions within the subroutine calls, O(kV k · kCk2 ). So these are
indeed polynomial-time algorithms.9
Note that GreedyWinner could easily be modified into a new polynomial-time algorithm
that, rather than checking whether a given candidate is the winner of the given Dodgson
election, finds all Dodgson winners by taking as input a Dodgson election alone (rather
than a Dodgson triple) and outputting a list of all the Dodgson winners in the election.
This modified algorithm on any Dodgson election (C, V ) would make exactly the same
calls to GreedyScore that the current GreedyWinner (on input (C, V, c), where c ∈ C)
algorithm makes, and the new algorithm would be accurate whenever every call it makes
to GreedyScore returns “definitely” as its second argument. Thus, whenever the current
GreedyWinner would return a “definitely” answer so would the new Dodgson-winner-finding
algorithm (when their inputs are related in the same manner as described above). These
comments explain why in the title (and abstract), we were correct in speaking of “finding
Dodgson-Election Winners” (rather than merely recognizing them).

4

Analysis of the Correctness Frequency of the Two Heuristic Algorithms

In this section, we prove that, as long as the number of votes is much greater than the
number of candidates, GreedyWinner is a frequently self-knowingly correct algorithm.
Throughout this section, regard V = (v1 , . . . , vn ) as a sequence of n independent observations of a random variable γ whose distribution is uniform over the set of all votes over a
set C = {1, 2, . . . , m} of m candidates, where γ can take, with equal likelihood, any of the
m! distinct total orderings over C. (This distribution should be contrasted with such work
as that of, e.g., [RM05], which in a quite different context creates dependencies between
voters’ preferences.)
The main intuition behind Theorem 4.1 is that, in any election having m candidates
and n voters, and for any two candidates c and d, it holds that, in exactly half of the ways v
a voter can vote, c <v d, but for exactly 1/m of the ways, c ≺v d. Thus, assuming that the
9

For completeness, we mention that when one takes into account the size of the objects being manipulated (in particular, under the assumption—which in light of the encoding scheme we will use below is not unreasonable—that it takes O(log kCk) time to look up a key in either Deficit or Votes and
O(log kV k) time to update the associated value, and each Swap operation takes O(log kCk) time) the running time of the algorithm might be more fairly viewed as O(kV k · kCk · (log kCk + log kV k)) (respectively,
O(kV k · kCk2 · (log kCk + log kV k))), though in any case it certainly is a polynomial-time algorithm.
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votes are chosen independently of each other, when the number of voters is large compared
to the number of candidates, with high likelihood the number of votes v for which c <v d
will hover around n/2 and the number of votes for which c ≺v d will hover around n/m.
This means that there will (most likely) be enough votes available for our greedy algorithms
to succeed.
Theorem 4.1. For each m, n ∈ N+ , the following hold. Let C = {1, . . . , m}.
1. Let V satisfy kV k = n. For each c ∈ C, if for all d ∈ C−{c} it holds that
3n
k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c <vi d}k ≤ 2mn+n
and k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c ≺vi d}k ≥ 4m
then
4m
GreedyScore(C, V, c) = (Score(C, V, c), “definitely”).
2. For each c, d ∈ C such that c 6= d, Pr((k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c <vi d}k >
−n
8m2

2mn+n
4m ) ∨ (k{i

∈

3n
{1, . . . , n} | c ≺vi d}k < 4m
, where the probability is taken over drawing
)) < 2e
uniformly at random an m-candidate, n-voter Dodgson election V = (v1 , . . . , vn ) (i.e.,
all (m!)n Dodgson elections having m candidates and n voters have the same likelihood
of being chosen).

3. For each c ∈ C, Pr(GreedyScore(C, V, c) 6= (Score(C, V, c), “definitely”)) < 2(m −
−n
1)e 8m2 , where the probability is taken over drawing uniformly at random an mcandidate, n-voter Dodgson election V = (v1 , . . . , vn ).
4. Pr((∃c ∈ C)[GreedyWinner(C, V, c) 6= (DodgsonWinner(C, V, c), “definitely”)]) <
−n
2(m2 − m)e 8m2 , where the probability is taken over drawing uniformly at random
an m-candidate, n-voter Dodgson election V = (v1 , . . . , vn ).
n
= n2 + 4m
, so, if k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c <vi d}k ≤
Proof of Theorem 4.1. For item 1, 2mn+n
4m
n
2mn+n
then
either
c
already
beats
d
or
if
not
then
the
defection of more than 4m
votes from
4m
preferring-d-to-c to preferring-c-to-d would (if such votes exist) ensure that c beats d. If
3n
k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c ≺vi d}k ≥ 4m
then (keeping in mind that we have globally excluded as
n
invalid all cases where at least one of n or m equals zero) k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c ≺vi d}k > 4m
,
and so GreedyScore will be able to make enough swaps (in fact, and this is critically
important in light of the GreedyScore algorithm, there is a sequence of swaps such that
any vote has at most one swap operation performed on it) so that c beats d. Item 2
follows from applying the union bound (which of course does not require independence)
to Lemma 4.3, which is stated and proven below. Item 3 follows from item 1 and from
applying item 2 and the union bound to
_
3n
2mn + n
)∨(k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c ≺vi d}k <
))).
Pr(
((k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c <vi d}k >
4m
4m
d∈C−{c}

Item 4 follows from item 1 and from applying item 2 and the union bound to
_
3n
2mn + n
)∨(k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c ≺vi d}k <
)))
Pr(
((k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c <vi d}k >
4m
4m
c,d∈C ∧ c6=d

(note that k{(c, d) | c ∈ C ∧ d ∈ C ∧ c 6= d}k = m2 − m).
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We now turn to stating and proving Lemma 4.3, which is needed to support the proof
of Theorem 4.1. Lemma 4.3 follows from the variant of Chernoff’s Theorem [Che52] stated
as Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2 ([AS00]). Let X1 , . . . , Xn be a sequence of mutually independent random
variables. If there exists a p ∈ [0, 1] ⊆ R such that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Pr(Xi = 1 − p) = p,
Pr(Xi = −p) = 1 − p,
2 /n

then for all a ∈ R where a > 0 it holds that Pr(Σni=1 Xi > a) < e−2a
Lemma 4.3.

1. Pr(k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c <vi d}k >

2. Pr(k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c ≺vi d}k <

3n
4m )

2mn+n
4m )

.

−n

< e 8m2 .

−n

< e 8m2 .

Proof. 1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define Xi as

1/2
if c <vi d,
Xi =
−1/2 otherwise.
Then k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c <vi d}k >
n
X

exactly if
2mn + n
4m




n
n
Since 21
− 12 n − 2mn+n
= 4m
, setting a = 4m
and p =
4m
4m
the desired result.
2. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, define Xi as

1/m
if c 6≺vi d,
Xi =
1/m − 1 otherwise.

1
2

i=1

Xi >

1
2



2mn+n
4m

2mn + n
4m




2mn+n

−

1
2



n−

.
in Theorem 4.2 yields

3n
3n
Then k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c ≺vi d}k < 4m
if and only if k{i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | c 6≺vi d}k > n − 4m
if and only if


 
n
X
3n
1
3n
1
−1
.
n−
+
Xi >
m
4m
m
4m
i=1

 3n
1
3n
1
n
n
1
Since m
n − 4m
+ m
− 1 4m
= 4m
, setting a = 4m
and p = 1 − m
in Theorem 4.2 yields
the desired result.

Theorem 4.4 captures the exact statement of our main results that, in the introduction,
we promised to establish.
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Theorem 4.4.
1. For each (election, candidate) pair it holds that if GreedyWinner outputs “definitely” as its second output component, then its first output component correctly answers the question, “Is the input candidate a Dodgson winner of the input
election?”
2. For each m, n ∈ N+ , the probability that a Dodgson election E selected uniformly at
random from all Dodgson elections having m candidates and n votes (i.e., all (m!)n
Dodgson elections having m candidates and n votes have the same likelihood of being selected) has the property that there exists at least one candidate c such that
GreedyWinner on input (E, c) outputs “maybe” as its second output component is
−n
less than 2(m2 − m)e 8m2 .
Proof. Theorem 4.4.1 follows from Theorem 3.2.2.
Theorem 4.1.4.

5

Theorem 4.4.2 follows from

Conclusion and Open Directions

The Dodgson voting system elegantly satisfies the Condorcet criterion. Although it is NPhard (and so if P 6= NP is computationally infeasible) to determine the winner of a Dodgson
election or compute scores for Dodgson elections, we provided heuristics, GreedyWinner and
GreedyScore, for computing winners and scores for Dodgson elections. We showed that
these heuristics are computationally simple. We also showed that, for a randomly chosen
election of a given size, if the number of voters is much greater than the number of candidates
(although the number of voters may still be polynomial in the number of candidates), then
we get with exceedingly high likelihood we get the right answer and we know that the
answer is correct.
We consider the fact that one can prove extremely frequent, self-knowing success even for
such simple greedy algorithms to be an advantage—it is good that one does not have to resort to involved algorithms to guarantee extremely frequent, self-knowing success. Nonetheless, it is natural to wonder to what degree these heuristics can be improved. What would
be the effect of adding, for instance, limited backtracking or random nongreedy swaps to
our heuristics? Regarding our analysis, in the distributions we consider, each vote is cast
independently of every other. What about distributions in which there are dependencies
between voters?
Though Definition 3.1 rigorously defines “self-knowingly correct,” we have been using
“frequent” more informally in uses such as “frequently self-knowingly correct”—the level
of frequency is specified in each case simply by whatever frequency our results prove. It
is natural to wonder whether one can state a general, abstract model of what it means
to be frequently self-knowingly correct. That would be a large project (that we heartily
commend as an open direction), and here we merely make a brief definitional suggestion
for a very abstract case—in some sense simpler to formalize than Dodgson elections, as
Dodgson elections have both a voter-set size and a candidate-set size as parameters, and
have a domain that is not Σ∗ but rather is the space of valid Dodgson triples—namely the
18

case of function problems where the function is total and the simple parameter of inputlength is considered the natural way to view and slice the problem regarding its asymptotics.
Such a model is often appropriate in computer science (e.g., a trivial such problem—leaving
tacit the issues of encoding integers as bit-strings—is f (n) = 2n, and harder such problems
are f (n) equals the number of primes less than or equal to n and f (0i ) = kSAT ∩ Σi k).
Definition 5.1. Let A be a self-knowingly correct algorithm for g : Σ∗ → T .
1. We say that A is
frequently
k{x∈Σn |A(x)∈T ×{“maybe”}}k
= 0.
limn→∞
kΣn k

self-knowingly

correct

for

g

if

2. Let h be some polynomial-time computable mapping from N to the rationals. We say
k{x∈Σn |A(x)∈T ×{“maybe”}}k
that A is h-frequently self-knowingly correct for g if
=
kΣn k
O(h(n)).
Since the probabilities that the above definition is tracking may be quite encoding dependent, the second part of the above definition allows us to set more severe demands
regarding how often the heuristic (which, being self-knowingly correct, always has the right
output when its second component is “definitely”) is allowed to remain uncommitted. One
sharp contrast between this framework and Impagliazzo’s [Imp95] notion of heuristic polynomial time is that his heuristic algorithms are not required to ever correctly assert their
correctness. In his model, one will know that one is often correct, but on each specific run
one in general will have no clue as to whether the proffered answer is correct.
Acknowledgments In an undergraduate project in one of our courses, G. Goldstein,
D. Berlin, K. Osipov, and N. Rutar proposed a more complex greedy algorithm for Dodgson
elections that possessed the self-knowing correctness property, and experimentally observed
that their algorithm was often successful. The present paper was motivated by their exciting
experimental insight, and seeks to prove rigorously that a greedy approach can be frequently
successful on Dodgson elections. We also thank the anonymous conference and journal
referees for their comments, which greatly improved the clarity and readability of this
article.
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